This paper investigates the effect of environmental innovations on firm profitability with respect to differences between small and medium-sized (SME) and large (LE) enterprises. Using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 2015, results show that, in general, SME benefit more from environmental innovations than LE. This effect is particularly strong for resource efficiency-improving innovations induced by regulation. These environmental innovations are significantly related to an increase in profits of SME, whilst related to a decrease in profits of LE. A robustness check with data from the MIP 2009, however, does not confirm this result as the effect for LE is insignificant and differences between the two groups cannot be found in this survey wave. A reason why negative effects for LE are observed in the MIP 2015 -but not in the MIP 2009 -might be that most LE had already exploited the potentials of environmental innovations when they were surveyed in the MIP 2015. This is supported by evidence suggesting that size-related differences in the MIP 2015 are driven by a negative relationship between LE's profits and environmental innovations related to externalities that were reduced by innovations in periods before.
Introduction
Climate change, resource scarcity and an increasing environmental pollution call for investments in environmentally friendly technologies. Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) argue that regulation 1 can stimulate necessary environmental innovations (EI). However, a common perspective by economists is that regulation restricts firms and shifts away productive investments to pollution abatement costs (Palmer et al. 1995 , Testa et al. 2011 . Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) also claim that this is not necessarily the case. Environmental regulation can additionally increase firm profitability, as environmental pollution may result from an inefficient use of resources and environmental regulation can point out potential technological improvements, which increase productivity. Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) prove that the validity of this assumption depends on whether regulation stimulates resource efficiency improvements, defined here as a reduction of energy, water or other material use per unit of output. They show empirically that only environmental process innovations which improve resource efficiency including innovations triggered by regulation are related to an increase, while other environmental process innovations are related to a decrease in firm profitability. I propose that, aside from resource efficiency improvements, firm size additionally affects profitability gains of regulation-induced environmental innovations. I assume this because smaller firms show different innovation patterns in comparison to larger firms (Acs & Audretsch 1988) . Those differences may also exist for environmental innovations (Klewitz & Hansen 2014) . Furthermore, Becker et al. (2013) and Evans (1986) find that regulation imposes less pollution abatement costs on smaller firms. Moreover, they often lack information about potential resource efficiency improvements (Constantinos et al. 2010 , Rahbauer et al. 2016 ). If environmental regulation signals firms how to increase efficiency (Anderson & Ullah 2014 , Ambec et al. 2013 ), the benefits from information gains could be higher in smaller firms, as there is less knowledge about potential resource efficiency improvements. Therefore, the effect of especially regulation-induced and resource efficiency-improving environmental innovations on firm profitability could be larger for smaller firms. However, the role of firm size for profitability gains of environmental innovations has not been analyzed yet. This paper attempts to fill this gap. I look at four types of environmental innovation, fol-1 This study summarizes all policy instruments defined as command-and-control instruments or market-based instruments as environmental regulations and does not distinguish between both kinds of policy instruments.
lowing Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) : regulation-induced resource efficiency innovation, regulation-induced other environmental innovation, voluntary resource efficiency innovation and voluntary other environmental innovation, and analyze whether their effect on firm profitability, which is measured by return on sales (ROS), depends on firm size. I apply data from two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), consisting in total of 6,303 German firms. The MIP 2015 is used for the main analysis and the MIP 2009 additionally for robustness checks. SME are defined as firms with less than 250 employees and less than e50 Million of annual sales.
The results confirm the assumption for the MIP 2015 wave. Environmental innovations are positively correlated with ROS only in SME. Moreover, an interaction term between the logarithmized number of employees and environmental innovations reveals that the positive effect of environmental innovations significantly decreases if the number of employees increases. Differentiating between the four types of environmental innovations shows that the positive effect in SME is solely related to innovations that improve resource efficiency and are regulation-induced. Moreover, the same type of innovation has a significantly negative influence in LE. The analysis of the MIP 2009 wave also shows only positive effects for SME. However, the interaction term does not show any significant size-related differences in this period.
Increasing size-related differences between both waves can be explained by a robustness check where evidence suggests that it gets more difficult after a while for LE to find EI that are profitable. This is because, in this group former environmental innovations negatively influence the profitability of current environmental innovations if they belong to the same dimension of environmental benefits. However, most firms, of small and large size, started to implement EI in 2009, therefore no size-related differences exist in this period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes previous empirical findings regarding the Porter hypothesis and size-dependent differences between firms. Data, theoretical approach and estimation strategy are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the main findings and section 5 further robustness checks. Results and study limitations are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
The Porter hypothesis and size-dependent differences regarding environmental innovations 2.1 The Porter hypothesis
Studies that build on Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) divide their hypothesis into three versions: a weak version (A), a narrow version (B) and a strong version (C) (Ambec et al. 2013 ). (A) The weak version merely claims that environmental regulation spurs innovation. Several studies confirm the weak version (Jaffe & Palmer 1997 , Brunnermeier & Cohen 2003 , Arimura et al. 2007 , Horbach 2008 , Horbach et al. 2012 , Ambec et al. 2013 . Studies also show that larger firms are more likely to implement an environmental innovation than smaller firms (Triguero et al. 2013 , Horbach et al. 2012 However, these studies do not consider that LE are generally more likely to implement an innovation because of their size. (B) The narrow version postulates that ("...) flexible regulatory policies [market-based instruments] give firms greater incentives to innovate and thus are better than prescriptive forms [command-and-control instruments] of regulation" (Ambec et al. 2013, p.5) . 3 According to my knowledge, there are no studies on the narrow version mentioning firm size issues. (C) The strong version states that properly designed regulations will offset compliance costs due to technological improvements (Porter 1991 , Porter & van der Linde 1995 . The strong version is the most relevant for firms, as it includes economic improvements. Therefore, I focus on related size-dependent issues.
Empirical studies of the strong version show ambiguous results. Cohen & Tubb (2018) find in a meta-analysis of 108 studies analyzing the strong version that those employing a lagged regulatory variable as well as those observing profitability changes on a country level are more likely to confirm the strong version. Analyzing 3,618 firms based on the MIP 2009, Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014, p.145) find that "(...) the Porter hypothesis does not hold in general for its strong version, but depends on the type of environmental innovation" and resource efficiency improvements are crucial for an increase in profitability. Ghisetti & Rennings (2014) come to the same conclusion by using MIP 2009 data as explanatory variables, but dependent variables from the MIP 2011. Investigating a water withdrawal regulation in Germany, Stoever & Weche (2018) find that the regulation in question does not affect firms' overall profitability, even though it increases investments in integrated (resource efficiency-improving) technologies. Different outcomes between 2 Triguero et al. (2013) only distinguish between small and medium-sized firms. Stoever & Weche's (2018) and Rexhäuser & Rammer's (2014) study, however, indicate that the type of environmental innovation (i.e. resource efficiency-improving vs. others)
is not the only factor which influences the effect of environmental innovations on firm profitability.
Size-dependent differences
Analyzing sustainability-oriented innovation of SME, Klewitz & Hansen (2014, p.59) argue that "SME will innovate differently than larger companies because they possess distinct organizational structures and capabilities." In the following, arguments that explain why size-dependent differences exist are presented. SME and LE differ in general by the following aspects: First, unit costs of EI might be higher in smaller firms in the presence of economies of scale (Stigler 1958 , Varian & Buchegger 2004 . This would affect SME profits negatively. 4 Second, innovation activities of SME and LE respond differently to the same technological and economic environment according to Winter (1984) and Acs & Audretsch (1988) . For example, innovation activities of smaller firms profit more from spillovers of technological knowledge generated by others (R&D spillovers) (Acs et al. 1994) . Moreover, Vossen (1998) states that SME and LE possess characteristics that lead to different relative advantages. Smaller firms, for example, may profit from shorter decision chains and a lower level of bureaucracy. Larger firms may often possess the ability to support the establishment of large R&D laboratories and the ability to spread risk over a portfolio of projects. Both, different responses to the technological and economic environment as well as different relative advantages could also be valid for environmental process innovations and may cause a difference in the profitability of EI, however, ex ante it is not possible to state which group profits more.
Regulation may affect SME and LE differently. Dean et al. (2000) consider three types of legislative asymmetries: (A) compliance asymmetries, (B) statutory asymmetries and (C) enforcement asymmetries. (A) Compliance asymmetries result from differences in compliance costs per unit of output. Compliance costs are all expenses that a firm makes in order to follow regulation. 5 An advantage for LE exists, for example, when 4 An employee that is exclusively dedicated to environmental issues like "waste reduction" is one example here.
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Compliance costs include salaries of people working in compliance, time or money spent on reporting and approval costs as well as investments required to meet the regulation targets. total compliance costs are the same for all firms. Hence, they are less per unit for LE. 6 (B) Statutory asymmetries result from an unequal legislation for smaller and larger firms.
They are included in most European and German environmental laws and are supposed to level the playing field between SME and LE. 7 Thus, if properly designed, they counterbalance compliance asymmetries. (C) Enforcement asymmetries exist when environmental law is unequally enforced by firm size. From a government's perspective, environmental improvement is less costly when a large firm is enforced, which pollutes relatively more, instead of many small firms as "(...) there are sizable fixed costs [paid by the government] involved in each investigation" (Dean et al. 2000, p.59) . Hence, large firms might be enforced more often as the government wants to reduce its spending. In addition, large firms might be more exposed to environmental regulation due to sector-specific differences as well. Different kinds of industries show different pollution levels and industries that cause more environmental pollution often have a higher share of LE (Constantinos et al. 2010 ). Becker et al. (2013) find that the net effect of all legislative asymmetries disadvantages larger firms. The study, however, considers only abatement costs. The current work aims to connect size-dependent differences of pollution abatement costs with the Porter hypothesis by analyzing whether regulation also causes a size-dependent profitability of environmental innovation.
Differences regarding the influence of regulation on resource efficiency im-
provements are likely because of the following issues: SME often lack knowledge regarding potential resource efficiency improvements (Constantinos et al. 2010 , Mattes et al. 2015 and implement resource efficiency-improving environmental innovations less often than large firms (Mattes et al. 2017) . 8 For example, in a survey dealing with compliance issues related to the British low carbon agenda with 141 SME in Derbyshire, Rahbauer et al. (2016) find that smaller firms struggle with target settings for energy consumption and waste outputs. Vernon et al. (2003) state that SME are rather reactive to environmental regulations than proactive. Accordingly, regulation may help (especially smaller) firms to overcome organizational inertia (Ambec & Barla 2002) . Moreover, regulation may inform firms about resource inefficiencies (Ambec et al. 2013 ) and there is less knowledge about potential resource efficiency improvements in SME. Thus, regulation and regulation-related information gains may help especially SME to increase resource 6 The issue resulting from economies of scale is comparable to the one resulting from compliance asymmetries.
7
For example, the German Immission Control Act (BImSchG; Gesetz zum Schutz vor schädlichen Umwelteinwirkungen durch Luftverunreinigungen, Geräusche, Erschütterungen undähnliche Vorgänge) includes special arrangements for combustion plants below a certain size.
8
It is not stated whether this result is influenced by regulation. efficiency and profitability. Table 1 summarizes all differences and their effects on a diverging profitability of EI.
Ex ante, the effect of general differences is ambiguous. This is because, even though economies of scale advantage larger firms, differences in the response to the technological and economic environment as well as relative advantages may offset negative effects.
The effect of legislative asymmetries is also ambiguous ex ante, as each asymmetry either advantages LE or SME and it cannot be predicted which asymmetry has the strongest influence. However, Becker et al. (2013) find higher pollution abatement costs for larger enterprises. Therefore, I assume that legislative asymmetries rather advantage SME.
Moreover, smaller firms should profit relatively more from regulations providing information gains related to resource efficiency improvements. Hence, regulation-induced resource efficiency innovations should show higher effects on profitability in SME compared to LE. 
Model
The model I use is based on the work of Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) 9 and analyzes the effect of EI on firm profitability. Pre-tax return on sales (ROS), defined as profits divided by return, is used to measure the latter. Moreover, the model includes firm and market-specific characteristics as additional explanatory variables. The effect of EI is analyzed with respect to product differentiation (PD), efficiency gains through regular process innovations (PC), competition intensity (CP), a firm's knowledge stock (KS), a firm's cost structure (CS) and a set of further control variables to account for sectorspecific and regional heterogeneity (C). The econometric model is illustrated in equation (1):
Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy includes two steps:
1. In the first step, I estimate whether the implementation of an environmental innovation is related to higher profits. The aim of this step is to analyze if size-specific differences exist regardless of the EI type. Accordingly, differences in the effects of resource efficiency improvements and regulation are not considered yet.
2. In the second step, I split environmental innovations into the four types-in regulationinduced as well as voluntary ones and then further into resource and other innova- (1) is replaced by four EI variables as illustrated in equation (2): 10
To observe differences between SME and LE, four different estimations are conducted in each step. The first three are based on equation (1). The first estimation includes all 9
For a detailed explanation of the model look in Rexhäuser & Rammer's (2014) study.
observations, the second analyzes only SME and the third only LE. The forth estimation is based on equation (3), which is an extension of equation (1). Firm size (S) is added here as an additional variable as well as an interaction term between firm size and environmental innovation. S is measured by the logarithmized number of employees. In the first step, the forth estimation is conducted as illustrated. In the second step, the EI interaction term is replaced by products between each innovation type and the logarithmized number of employees.
The interpretation of the environmental innovation variable in equation (3) Furthermore, I use an interval-censored regression model because firms do not report the exact percentage of ROS in the MIP, but they report ROS-intervals -e.g. between 0%
and 2%. Hence, the applied dependent variable is ordinal-scaled. Therefore, an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression model cannot be used. However, as interval limits of ROS are known, an interval-censored regression can be applied (Verbeek 2008) , which is best described as an ordered probit model with known interval limits. According to Wooldridge (2002) , the estimated coefficients can be directly interpreted as partial effects.
Data and variable description

Data
German data of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 12 , which is an annual survey conducted in panel format by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), is used. 13 11 I choose the logarithmized number of employees as an interaction term and not an SME-LE dummy because the extra information that the SME-LE dummy would provide is similar to the information from a comparison of the second and third estimation with a Wald test.
12
See Peters & Rammer (2013) for details on the survey.
13
Germany is selected for the analysis because it possesses comparatively high regulation standards in the EU (Rexhäuser & Rammer 2014 ). Furthermore, the environmental law of the European Union
The MIP is the German contribution to the European Commission's Community Innovation Survey (CIS) and follows its methodology. The MIP covers both manufacturing and service sectors. It is conducted as a mail survey including an option to respond online.
Only applied to test for a non-random sorting of firms (Heckman 1979) . The inverse Mills ratio is not significant. Hence, a selection bias can be ruled out. 16 is considered to be the worldwide most extensive (Jordan 2012) .
Variable description
14 The number of observations differs from Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) because of differences in the data preparation process.
15
Missing values of control variables are imputed by the sector mean of the respective size class.
16
The results of the Heckman selection model are available from the author upon request.
17
Dividing firms merely by two groups (SME and LE) allows concluding about firm size differences with respect to only one graduation. Nevertheless, only one graduation is chosen to insure sufficiently large sample sizes.
The MIP gathers information concerning ROS by asking firms about earnings before taxes (EBT) as a percentage of turnover. Firms do not have to reveal the exact number, they choose between nine intervals as illustrated in Table 2 . ROS is measured at the end of the reference period (2014 for MIP 2015) and at the middle of the reference period (2013 for MIP 2015), but ROS measured at the end of the reference period is used as dependent variable. In both waves the median return on sales lies in the interval '4% to <7%' for all observations as well as for SME. For LE it lies in the interval '2% to <4%'. Hence, the median return on sales is generally higher for SME. 18 The MIP 2015 asks in a question based on the harmonized CIS questionnaire whether an environmental process innovation has been implemented within the last three years,
18
According to a Pearson's chi-squared test, the distribution of ROS significantly differs between SME and LE (MIP 2015: p-value < 0.001, MIP 2009: p-value = 0.04). See Plackett (1983) for a method description of the Pearson's chi-squared test. The distribution of SME is greater at the highest and at the lowest ROS-interval; and the distribution of LE is higher in the middle of the ROS-intervals. This is in line with deviating business risks between SME and LE because SME have usually fewer projects, which can either be successful or fail. Thus, they are more likely to be found in extreme intervals. All remaining environmental innovations I consider as voluntary. Thereafter, regulationinduced and voluntary innovations are divided into resource efficiency-improving and other innovations. Resource efficiency-improving EI include innovations which "reduced energy use per unit of output" or "reduced material or water use per unit of output". Other EI include innovations that "reduced air emissions" (except CO 2 ), "reduced water or soil pollution", "reduced noise pollution", "replaced fossil energy sources with renewable energy sources" or "replaced materials with less hazardous substitutes". Two further dimensions of environmental innovations are excluded from the analysis because they cannot be assigned unambiguously to either of the two types, these are EI with "reduced CO 2 emissions" or "improved recycling of materials, waste or water".
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MIP 2015: All firms that reported to be at least on a medium level (four-point Likert Scale) influenced by the mentioned reasons; MIP 2009: All firms that answered with "yes".
A problem occurs in this step because the influence of regulation has not been observed independently for each dimension of environmental benefits. LE generally show a higher share of any innovative activity, which simply reflects that the probability that a certain event occurs within a certain period of time tends to increase by the size of an organization. In addition, LE might be more exposed to regulation than SME, or LE may implement more often environmental innovations in response to regulation. firm's knowledge stock (KS) is difficult to measure. Fortunately, firms that produce novel knowledge are likely to protect their knowledge by means of intellectual property rights (IPR) while other firms do not. Hence, firms' use of IPR is taken as a proxy for KS.
Therefore, the dummy variable use of IPR takes the value 'one' if a firm used intellectual property rights and it takes the value 'zero' otherwise. Information about the use of IPR is only provided in the MIP 2015. 44% of all LE but only 21% of all SME reported to use intellectual property rights. Furthermore, competition pressure (CP) is measured by a dummy which is 'one' if at least three of the following questions were answered with "applies fully" or "applies mainly" 21 : 1."Are products and services from competitors easily substituted by those of your enterprise?" 2."Is the entry of new competitors a major threat to your market position?" 3."Are competitors' actions difficult to predict?" 4."Is costumer demand development difficult to predict?" 5."Is your firm facing strong competition from abroad? 6."Do price increases lead to immediate loss of clients?". In the MIP 2015, 60%
of all SME reported a high competition intensity, 5% more than LE.
In order to take into account sector-specific differences, 21 sector dummies based on a twodigit NACE code are integrated in the econometric model as well. 22 Firm size is included in every estimation since economies of scale may also affect regular unit costs. The variable is measured by the natural logarithm of employees at full-time equivalents at the end of the reference period. Another driver-especially of resource efficiency improvements-are increased (relative) energy and material prices (Rexhäuser & Rammer 2014 , Popp 2002 , Newell et al. 1999 , Jaffe & Stavins 1995 . Thus, the effect of environmental innovations on profitability could be biased due to impacts of resource price changes. The dummy variable pressure of increasing input prices controls for this, which is only reported in the MIP 2015. It is 'one' if a firm stated that cost-saving motivations were "high" or "medium" important for introducing an EI and 'zero' otherwise. On average, 27% of all SME and 44% of all LE reported increasing input prices as a motivation. Furthermore, firm profitability may be influenced by a firm's market share because it increases market power and allows setting higher price (Buzzell et al. 1975) . 23 According to the MIP 2015,
21
The two highest answers on a four-point Likert scale.
22
The sectors are presented in Table 8 in the Appendix.
23
Besides, market share is related to competition intensity (CP) and is an indicator for productivity (Ravenscraft 1983 , Foster et al. 2008 , Shepherd 1972 , and therefore, related to the firm's cost structure (CS) as well.
LE possess a market share of 22% and SME of 13% on average. Moreover, East Germany is characterized by specific economic and institutional structures. Consequently, market and firm-specific characteristics may depend on the firm's location. The dummy firm in East Germany takes the value 'one' if a firm is located in the eastern part of Germany and it has the value 'zero' otherwise. 36% of all SME and 17% of all LE in the sample are located in East Germany. 24 Furthermore, the asset-to-sales ratio, which is a firm's asset divided by its total revenue, is included because it is an indicator of an industries' capital requirements (Rexhäuser & Rammer 2014) ; and therefore, connected to market-specific characteristics. 25 The average asset-to-sales ratio for SME is 38% and for LE 36%. Thus, capital intensity only slightly differs between both groups.
24
The share of firms located in East Germany in the MIP sample is higher than in the total population of firms due to oversampling.
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Moreover, the asset-to-sales ratio is related to market entry barriers. Thus, it is linked to competition intensity (CP) as well. Results of the first step are illustrated in Table 4 . Estimating all firms jointly, ROS increases by 0.72 percentage points on average if a firm has an environmental innovation.
Results
First step: EI in general
Estimations (2) and (3) reveal, however, that a positive significant coefficient is only observable for SME (0.84 percentage points on average). Thus, the general positive effect observed in estimation (1) is rather driven by SME. Comparing the EI coefficients of estimations (2) and (3) by means of a Wald test shows that the difference between both groups is not significant (p-value = 0.33). Employing the interaction term (estimation (4)) confirms, however, that the positive effect of EI diminishes when the number of employees increases. Hence, the smaller the number of employees, the higher the benefits of environmental innovations. Besides, the estimated coefficient of the environmental innovation dummy (2.31 percentage points on average) becomes larger when applying the interaction term.
Second step: Different types of EI
In the second step, I analyze which EI types drive the general relationship between EI and ROS. Table 5 presents the results. According to estimation (1), none of the four innovation types is significant. Estimation (2) and (3) tion between this innovation type and profits in firms with just a few employees is very high. Moreover, the coefficient of voluntary resource innovations becomes significant with a coefficient size of 1.98 percentage points. Looking at the interaction terms, regulationinduced resource innovations have a negative significant coefficient (-0.89). Consequently, the estimated coefficient of regulation-induced resource innovations decreases if the number of employees increases. The interaction term of voluntary resource innovations also shows a negative relationship, but the interaction term is only significant at a 10% level with a p-value of 0.09. Moreover, the main effect of employees in logs is not significant anymore, which indicates that the size coefficients especially in estimations (1) and (2) capture some size effects of environmental innovations.
In summary, the results show that environmental innovations in general are positively related to ROS. Splitting the observations between SME and LE indicates that the positive effect can only be attributed to SME, but this difference is not significant. Employing the interaction term, however, confirms that the positive effect of EI diminishes when the number of employees increases. Dividing environmental innovations by possible combinations of resource and regulation status indicates that differences are mainly driven by regulation-induced resource innovations. Including interaction terms in the second step shows that profitability increases with both types of resource innovations, but benefits are higher and significantly size-dependent when the innovation is regulation-driven. Besides, coefficients of other innovation types are not significant. On the other hand, relationships may have changed. To put it more precisely, the relationship between EI types and profitability may differ between both periods. This could be because returns of environmental innovations decreased especially for LE between the 2009 and the 2015 wave, but not for SME. This would indicate that size differences might vary over time.
To identify which issue causes the difference, the second step of the main analysis is repeated with MIP 2009 data. However, the same set of control variables is not available in both waves. Consequently, the analysis is only conducted with variables that are available for both periods. 27 The results are presented in Table 6 . Estimation (1) shows
26
The results are available from the author upon request.
27
An estimation with same empirical approach as Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) use was conducted as well. Except some minor differences it was possible to replicate their results.
that most EI coefficients still differ from Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) . Hence, differences in the empirical approach-i.e. a modified questionnaire and a different set of control variables-cause diverging results. But regulation-induced resource innovations still have a significant coefficient. Therefore, the relationship between regulation-induced resource innovations and profitability seems to be robust for the MIP 2009 because it is significant in both, my study as well as Rexhäuser & Rammer's (2014) .
Even though the empirical approach causes diverging results, relationships still may have changed between both waves. Estimations (2) and (3) show results of both groups with MIP 2009 data and this study's empirical approach. The coefficient of regulation-induced resource improvements remains significant only for SME, but not for LE. However, the coefficients between both groups do not differ significantly according to a Wald test. This indicates that size differences have no strong impact in the MIP 2009. Hence, the analyzed time period may determine profitability gains of EI and respective size differences. In estimations (4) and (5) a regression with interaction terms is conducted with the same set of control variables for both waves. Estimation (4) presents results for the MIP 2009 and estimation (5) for the MIP 2015. In estimation (4) none of the coefficients is significant, but results of estimation (5) are similar to the main findings presented in Table 5 in section 4. Thus, for the MIP 2015 size differences are significant and robust, whereas for the MIP 2009 size differences cannot be observed. A Wald test indicates that the interaction term related to regulation-induced resource innovations significantly differs between both estimations (p-value = 0.04). Therefore, the size-dependency of EI changed between both waves.
As relationships changed, it is important to identify why and how firm size is related to it.
If a firm starts to be environmentally active, it will probably first choose EI that reduce environmental pollution at low cost. However, the more environmental innovations a firm implements, the more difficult it might get to find another EI which is at least cost neutral.
Hence, the development of new ways to reduce environmental pollution is likely to become more expensive over time, especially for developers of new processes. Since the start of a new federal government in Germany in 1998, formed by a coalition of the social democratic party and the green party, environmental policy has gained importance in Germany. A lot of the present environmental regulations were introduced in the early 2000s (Jänicke The results are presented in Table 7 . The first estimation shows that only EI exclusively implemented in the 2012-2014 period have a significant effect on profitability. In estimation (2), EI coefficients are not significant but point all into a positive direction.
The sample is much smaller than in the main analysis and there is some multicollinearity between the coefficients, which explains why the coefficients of this estimation may not be significant anymore. However, estimation (3) 
Taking account of past performence
A further analytical issue is potential endogeneity (Verbeek 2008) . In other words, not only environmental innovations might influence firm profitability, but also firm profitability might influence the introduction of environmental innovations (King & Lenox 2001 , Nelling & Webb 2009 ). Firms with higher profitability are likely to have slack resources.
Therefore, they might be more willing to invest in sustainable technologies. Consequently, an endogeneity problem cannot be ruled out. 28 To take into account past performance, dummy variables for each ROS-interval from 2013 are generated and integrated into the 28 Unfortunately, the interval structure of the ROS variable does not allow to take differences between two periods. Hence, it is not possible to calculate the change in profits resulting from the implementation of an EI.
model as explanatory variables. 29 Accordingly, nine dummies capture ROS in 2013. For example, one dummy takes the value 'one' if a firm reported a return between 2% and 4% in 2013 and 'zero' otherwise. The results from the second step are presented in Table 8 .
The integration of lagged ROS-dummies in the model increases the significance of most of the environmental innovation coefficients in the estimation. However, the size of the coefficients decreases. But comparing the coefficients with the results shown in Table 5 (main results) by means of a Wald test reveals no significant difference between the two estimates. Hence, this robustness check does not support the assumption of potential endogeneity.
Discussion & study limitations
Previous literature claims that -besides providing environmental benefits -regulationdriven environmental innovations increase firm profitability. Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) state that this is only valid for innovations that improve resource efficiency. The dummies can be interpreted in the following way: Each ROS-interval dummy has a different likelihood that the ROS in the next period (2014) will be high. A high estimated coefficient of a profitability dummy indicates a high likelihood that the profitability in the next period will be on a high level. Porter (1991) and Porter & van der Linde (1995) state that regulation-induced environmental innovations can increase firm profitability. Rexhäuser & Rammer (2014) show with the MIP 2009 for the German economy that only resource efficiency-improving innovations increase, while other environmental innovations decrease profitability regardless of whether regulation-induced or not. As environmental innovation patterns differ between SME and LE (Klewitz & Hansen 2014) , I additionally claim that firm size influences profitability gains of EI as well. This is because general differences between SME and LE, legislative asymmetries as well as differences regarding the influence of regulation on resource efficiency improvements may cause diverging effects.
Conclusion
To test my assumption, I use data from two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) consisting in total of 6,303 German firms. The MIP 2015 is used for the main analysis and the MIP 2009 for robustness checks. My results confirm size differences for the MIP 2015 wave, which are mainly driven by regulation-induced resource innovations. Such environmental innovations are significantly related to an increase in profits of SME, but to a decrease in profits in LE. However, I do not find significant size-dependent difference in the MIP 2009 wave. That's why I conclude that the role of firm size differences depends on the specific time period. One explanation for this result is that profitable EI might be more likely when a firm starts to substantially reduce the environmental impacts of its activities, but after a while it is likely that it gets more difficult to find further profitable EI. As LE implemented more EI in the past already, this issue is more relevant for them and explains size differences in the MIP 2015 wave. However, size differences in the MIP 2009 wave are not observable because most firms just might started to reduce environmental externalities, due to a change in federal policy.
As size differences vary between the observed time periods, it is difficult to define concrete policy implications. But I recommend that environmental law should take into account different innovation patterns between larger and smaller firms and potential legislative asymmetries. Additionally, policies that provide information about potential technological improvements have the chance to increase resource efficiency and especially support smaller firms.
Due to data restrictions, this study represents only a first approach to the analysis of firm size differences related to the Porter hypothesis. Further studies should observe the role of regulation as well as pollution abatement costs for all firms, not solely for those that implemented an environmental innovation. Additionally, an in-depth (qualitative) investigation analyzing which differences between SME and LE are the most influential for diverging effects of regulation-induced resource efficieny improvements would complement my results. Moreover, the influence of time and regulation regime should be analyzed more deeply. For example, investigating if and how the rate of environmental innovations induced by a specific policy varies over time and whether respective effects differ for SME and LE could provide a deeper insight. 
